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Abstract
Diamond’s two-period OLG growth model is based on the assumption
that the stock of capital in any period is equal to the wealth accumu-
lated in the previous period by the generation of pensioners. This stock
equlibrium condition may appear an innocuous paraphrase of the ordinary
macro-economic flow equilibrium condition, S = I.
This is not the case. In this note I demonstrate that Diamond’s so-
lution is unstable in a monetary market economy where households and
firms make independent decisions as to how much to save and how much
to invest. An increase in the rate of interest above the Diamond long-run
equilibrium level will cause saving to fall by more than investment and,
hence, result in excess demand for loanable funds and an upward pressure
on the rate of interest.
However, substituting the ordinary S = I flow equilibrium condition
for Diamonds stock equilibrium condition reveals that the model has an-
other solution - the rate of interest equals the rate of growth - and that
this solution is stable in a capital-based economy (contrary to the pure
consumption loan model of interest suggested by Samuelson(1958)).
The model has interesting implications. Diamond’s model predict that
an increase in rate of time preference causing the young generation to save
less will reduce the capital stock and raise the rate of interest. However,
the S = I based two period OLG model reveals that the old generation’s
consumption falls by more than the the young generation’s consumption
increases. Consequently, excess supply of loanable funds will drive down
the rate of interest. If the rate of interest is equal to the rate of growth
an increase in the time preference has no eﬀect on the supply of loanable
funds and, consequently, neither on the rate of interest or the stock of
capital. Whether people prefer to consume as young or old should not
be a matter of public concern (although the transition from one state to
another may be).
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1 Introduction
The Diamond (1965) growth model has become a classic. Today, 40 years after
the publication of "National debt in a neoclassical growth model" we find the
model reproduced in most text-books of growth theory and advanced macroeco-
nomics. Not exactly in the somewhat obscure form in which it was originally
presented by Diamond. It has become distilled into a simple easy-to-understand
textbook model which leaves aside the questions that triggered Diamond.
Diamond’s problem was to square the insights provided by Samuelson’s "An
exact onsumption-loan model of interest with and without the social contrivance
of money" from 1958 - the first OLG-mode (?) - and Phelps’ Solow-inspired
"Golden Rule of Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen" from 1961. The prob-
lem was that the solution of the Samuelson-model - the rate of interest equals the
rate of growth - was found to be unstable (without some kind of social contract),
and that Phelps’ advice to growthmen who wanted to attain the maximum sus-
tainable per capita consumption - i.e. equate the saving and the capital income
ratios - hinged on economic policy to pursue this goal. That triggered three
questions: What is the long-run (stable) rate of interest in a capital-based mar-
ket econommy? Might it be equal to the socially optimal rate, i.e. the rate of
growth? What is the impact on the rate of interest (and the stock of capital) of
national debt?
In this note I pose the daring assertion that Diamond’s analysis is flawed.
Diamond’s analysis is based on the implicit assumption that the households have
access to no other temporary abode for purchasing power but real (productive)
capital and, consequently in a two-period OLG setting, that the stock of capital
available to the young generation must be equal to the previous generation’s
saving. Apparently, Diamond assumes that this (stock) equilibrium condition
is equivalent to the macroeconomic equilibrium condition that current supply
equals current demand or, as the classical economists put it, that the supply of
loanable funds equals the demand for loanable funds.
As I demonstrate in this note, substituting the (flow) equilibrium condition
for the (stock) equilibrium condition turns his results upside down. The equi-
librium rate pof interest derived by Diamond is found to be unstable. However,
the model has two roots and the other (an stable) one is the socially optimal
one, cf. the rate of interest equals the rate of growth.
2 A simplified version of the Diamond model
As Samuelson, Diamond considers a two-period OLG model. Each generation
works in one period and live as pensioners from their saving for yet another
period. The problem of the representative household is to determine how much
of its first-period (wage)income, w, it should save for consumption in the sec-
ond period. The problem of the representative firm is to determine the profit
maximizing capital stock per employee.
To make things as simple as possible (and true to both the Samuelson model
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and the original version of the Diamond model) we shall assume that
• Each new generation is born "naked" (i.e. that they have no initial wealth)
• The rate of growth of the population (n) is exogenous
• There is no technological progress
• Households’ utility function is log-linear
• Firms face a C-D production function
• No uncertainty
2.1 Household behavior
A household ’born’ in period t maximizes its utility function
U = ln(c1t) +
1
1 + ρ
· ln (c2t)
subject to its budget constraint
c1t + c2t · 1
1 + rt+1
≤ wt
The notation (and presentation of the solution) follow Romer (2001) rather
than the original Diamond (1965) paper:
cjt - consumption i period j, j = (1, 2)
rt+1 - the rate of interest in period t+ 1, i.e. the return in period t+ 1
from saving in period t
ρ - rate of time preference (constant)
The solution (f.o.c.) is
c1t =
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
· wt (1)
c2t =
1 + rt+1
2 + ρ
· wt (2)
s1t = wt − c1t =
1
2 + ρ
· wt (3)
2.2 Firm behavior
A representative firm maximizes profit per worker
πt = yt − kt · rt
with respect to the stock of capital per worker, kt, subject to the production
function
yt = kαt (4)
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The solution (f.o.c) is
kt =
µ
α
rt
¶ 1
1−α
(5)
from which
yt =
µ
α
rt
¶ α
1−α
(6)
kt = α · ytrt (7)
2.3 Diamond’s solution
Diamond solves the model by imposing the equilibrium condition that the stock
of capital in period t+1 must be equal to the young generation’s saving in
the previous period. Normalizing the size of the population in period t to one
Diamond’s (stock) equilibrium condition reduces to
kt+1 =
s1t
1 + n
By expressing s1t and kt+1as functions of, respectively, rt and rt+1, he derives
the equation of motion of r
rt+1 =
∙
α
1− α · (2 + ρ) · (1 + n)
¸1−α
· rαt (8)
depicted below
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Figure 1: The equation of motion of r (for α = 0.3333, n = 0.10, ρ = 0.05)
The steady state solution is
k∗ =
µ
(1− α)
(2 + ρ) · (1 + n)
¶ 1
1−α
(9)
r∗ = y0(k∗) =
α
1− α · (2 + ρ) · (1 + n) (10)
Diamond concludes that the equilibrium solution is unique and stable, and
that the economy will move towards the golden rule steady state only in the
highly unlikely case that
n =
α · (2 + ρ)
1− α · (3 + ρ) (11)
2.4 Romer’s solution
Romer derives the equilibrium solution by expressing s1t as a function of kt
which result in the following equation of motion of k
kt+1 =
s1t
1 + n
=
(1− α)
(2 + ρ) · (1 + n) · k
α (12)
depicted in figure 2 below
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Figure 2: The equation of motion of k (for α = 0.3333, n = 0.10, ρ = 0.05)
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The steady state solution is, of course, the same as derived above.
For the reference parameter values in this paper (α = 0.3333, n = 0.10,
ρ = 0.05) we get k∗ = 0.161, r∗ = 1.13
Surprisingly and unlike Samuelson (1958), neither Diamond, nor Romer com-
ment on the economic sense of the equilibrium solution of the model. For
α = 0.3333, n = 0, ρ = 0, i.e. when no of the three causes of interest sug-
gested by Böhm-Bawerk (Lutz, 1968) apply, the model suggests an equilibrium
rate of interest of 1 (=100 percent)! What is the intuition behoind that result?
2.5 An alternative solution
It appears surprising that Diamond (contrary to Samuelson) imposes the con-
straint that the stock of capital must be equal to the wealth of households rather
than the ordinary macroeconomic equilibrium condition
S = I
Apparently Diamond assumes that the (stock) equilibrium conditionis just
an innocuous paraphrase of the common macro-economic (flow) equilibrium
condition. However, that is a serious mistake. The two equilibrium conditions
are not identical and substituting the flow eaqilibrium conditoin for the (stock)
equilibrium condition produces very diﬀerent results.
By definition national saving,St, is equal to income (GDP) minus consump-
tion
St = yt − c1t −
c2,t−1
1 + n
= yt −
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
· (1− α) · yt − 1 + rt
(2 + ρ) · (1 + n) · (1− α) · yt−1 (13)
Investment, It, is by definition equal the addition to the capital stock in
period t, i.e.
It = α · yt+1rt+1 · (1 + n)− α ·
yt
rt
(14)
By substituting r∗ for rt+j and y∗ for yt+j , j = (−1, 0, 1) get the following
equilibrium condition
1− (1− α) ·
∙
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
+
1 + r∗
(2 + ρ) · (1 + n)
¸
= α · n
r∗
(15)
The equation has two roots
r∗ = n; r∗ =
α
1− α · (2 + ρ) · (1 + n) (16)
of which the first one corresponds to the solution of Samuelson’s pure consump-
tion loan model of interest rate and the second one to the solution suggested by
Diamond and Romer.
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2.6 Stability analysis
The fact that we find two solutions if we reject the unrealistic assumption that
household wealth must be equal to the value of productive capital poses the
question: Are the solutions stable?
The answer to this question might have appeared obvious to Diamond. At
the time he wrote his paper it was well-known that the neat r = n solution of
Samuelson’s pure consumption loan model was unstable (at least without some
kind of social contract) and regarded as an intellectual curiosity.
This result does not carry over in (our simplified version of) the Diamond
model (as, Diamond apparently assumed).
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Figure 3: The ratios of investment and saving to income as a functions of the
rate of interest (for α = 0.333, n = 0.1, ρ = 0.05, γ = 0, τ = 0)
Figure 1 illustrates why. The S/y is a linear function in r and I/y = f(r)
is a hyperbola. Consequently, (if the model has a solution), the S/y and I/r
schedules must intersect twice (if the two solutions don’t coincide)1. The lower
solution is stable (as ∂(S − I)/∂r > 0, indicating an excess supply of loanable
funds and a downward pressure on the rate of interest) and the higher solution
is unstable (as ∂(S − I)/∂r < 0,indicating an excess demand for loanable funds
and an upward pressure on the rate of interest). In the Samuelson model there
1Diamond (p. 1132 and 1132) draws graphs indicationg that the saving function is linear
and the capital demand curve convex from origo, but curriously he drawings indicate just
one solution that might be stable (if the saving function is steeper than the capital demand
function) or unstable if the capital demand function is the steeper one.
7
is no productive capital. The downward sloping saving function implies that
∂(S − I)/∂r < 0 for all values of r and, consequently, that the solution is
unstable.
Which of the two roots in our model is the lower one? In the simple Diamond
model analyzed here, there can be little doubt, that - contrary to what Diamond
assumed - r∗ = n is the stable root. For r∗ = α1−α · (2 + ρ) · (1 + n) to be stable
we must have that
n >
α · (2 + ρ)
1− 3 · α− ρ · α
which appears inconceivable for any realistic value of α2. (To see that, assume
that the capital income share takes a value in the neighborhood of 13 .)
2.7 Implications
2.7.1 The eﬀect of an increase in the time preference (ρ)
In Diamond’s model an increase in the time preference reduces the young gen-
eration’s saving and, consequently, the stock of capiotal for the next generation.
The rate of interest increases. However, if r∗ = n, then the time preference has
no eﬀect on the rate of interest, the stock of capital and total income.
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2Diamond considers only one root, r∗ = α
1−α ·(2+ρ)·(1+n).As he (contrary to Samuelson)
’assumes’ that the economy is stable, that root must be stable! He does not address the
problem that the rate of interest should be in the order of magnitude of 100 percent in case
of no growth and no time preference (Böhm’s first and second cause of interest).
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Figure 4: The eﬀect of an increase in the rate of time preference, ρ, from 0.05
to 0.5
As illustrated in figure 2, the only eﬀect of an increase in ρ is to rotate the S/y
schedule clockwise around the equilibrium, r∗ = n, S/y = α. The saving ratio
falls if r∗ < n and increases if r∗ > n. That may sound counter-intuitive.
However, the logic is clear enough: The young generation saves less, but the
reduction in the older generation’s consumption is even larger, so total saving
increases.
2.7.2 The eﬀect of fiscal policy
Suppose that the government increases public consumption by a constant frac-
tion of y, G = γ · y, and raises taxes by a constant fraction of y, T = τ · y.
Public expenditures and taxes have no eﬀect on the I/y schedule, but aﬀect the
location and/or slope of the S/y schedule,
S/y =
∙
1− (1− α) ·
µ
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
+
1 + r∗
(2 + ρ) · (1 + n)
¶¸
· (1− τ) + (τ − γ) (17)
An isolated increase in γ causes a parallel shift of the S/y schedule towards
the left. The lower (stable) root rises and the higher (unstable) root falls (figure
5a). This is what we would expect. However, Diamond is in troubles, he only
gets the same (qualitative) result by assuming that r∗ = α1−α · (2 + ρ) · (1 + n)
is stable.
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Figure 5a: The eﬀect of an increase in public expenditures ( γ = 0.1)
A balanced budget expansion, γ = τ > 0 causes a clockwise rotation of the
S/y schedule (the schedule gets steeper). The lower (stable) root rises and the
higher (unstable) root falls, but by less than in the former case (figure 5b).
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Figure 5b: The eﬀect of a balanced budget expansion (γ = τ = 0.1)
An isolated increase in τ shifts the S/y schedule upwards and rotate it
clockwise. The lower (stable) root falls and the higher (unstable) foot rises.
(Figure 5c)
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Figure Figure 5c: The eﬀect of an increase in taxation ( τ = 0.1)
The results are reproduced below for the following parameter values: α =
0.333, n = 0.10, ρ = 0.05
τ = 0, γ = 0 τ = 0.1, γ = 0 τ = 0, γ = 0.1 τ = 0.1, γ = 0.1
r∗1 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.11
r∗2 1.13 1.52 0.73 1.11
Clearly, only the r∗ = n solution is consistent with main-stream macro-
economics.
2.7.3 The eﬀect of public debt
Assume that the government has a debt, B, and pursues the policy of keeping
the debt constant as a fraction of income, b = B/y. This policy implies that
the government may increase its debt in each period by ∆Bt = Bt−1 · n and
only needs collect taxes equal to T = τ · y = b · y · (r − n), i.e. set the tax rate
τ = b · (r − n),
The I/y schedule is unaﬀected, but the S/y schedule becomes a non-linear
function of r,
S/y = f(r) =
∙
1− (1− α) ·
µ
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
+
1 + r
(2 + ρ) · (1 + n)
¶¸
(18)
·(1− b · (r − n)) + b · (r − n) (19)
f 0(r) < 0 for b <
1
(1 + ρ) · (1 + n) + (1 + r) + r − n (20)
f 00(r) = 2 · b · 1− α
(2 + ρ) · (1 + n) (21)
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The eﬀect of public debt and a balanced budget policy is depicted in figure
6 for various value of b.For high value of b the model has only one root, r = n.
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Figure 6: The eﬀect of a constant public debt (
τ = b · (r − n), b = 0; b = 0.1; b = 0.5)
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